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INTRODUCTION 
 
They say that history is written by the winners. We can add that the winners are also 
writing the ethical codes of war and the codes of justice in international affairs. Might 
this be a stereotype phrase of the defeated or even of those who wish to rewrite history 
or does it have a dose of reality in it? In any case when someone attempts to present a 
new fold of history or even to enrich one already existing with new findings, great 
attention is required. There are many reasons to do so and not only political ones. 
Needless mention the political motives behind some of the attempts to alter the 
historical charting of facts. So the skepticism arising from relevant attempts is naturally 
strong. At the same time relevant thinking should be stochastic and flexible in order to 
be able to distinguish the circumstances under which new rudiments are presented 
which could be interpreted in a different way, significantly changing what was known 
so far. These should be based always on appropriate documentation so that their 
validity is ensured. 
 
Wallace Report
2 
belongs to the category of the historical sources that lately made quite 
a noise concerning its content
3
. Some claimed that a new registration of the historical 
reality is being attempted in order to blot on the efforts, actions or motives of the one or 
the other side during the German occupation of Greece. The relevant discussions went 
beyond the scientific confrontation reaching up to the point of public altercation. On the 
one side the supporters of the political Left point out that the essay reveals the dark role 
of Britain and the servility of the political Right. The other side repudiates the 
imputations by supporting that the leftist resistance groups have caused the civil war 
because of their eagerness to take over the power in the country after the departure of 
the Germans. 
 
Indisputably, the role of Britain was crucial under any point of view. It couldn’t be any 
other way since that country was the main opponent of the Germans (during the first 
  
two years of the war) and the quarterback of the resistance in Europe. The price it paid 
was indeed enormous, not so much in human losses as in the loss of “geopolitical 
power”. The end of the Second World War (WWII) coincides with the end of the two 
remaining colonial empires of the planet, the loser Japan but also the winner Britain. 
The involvement of Britain in the internal affairs of Greece, during its occupation by 
the Germans and after its liberation, was significant to such a degree that determinately 
impinged on the molding of the political developments in Greece and generally in the 
Hellenism of Diaspora. 
 
The present article aims to concisely present the British foreign policies and the policies 
of the two dominant political and ideological poles in Greece at that time. The Wallace 
Report gave the incentive for undertaking this historic journey in that turbulent period. 
A journey that will present, through the prism of the author’s point of view, the political 
situation of the country. At the same time, it will make more understandable the 
geopolitical dogma of Churchill’s Britain and its consequences on Greece. The basic 
investigatory questions which we will try to answer: why the British reinforced EAM- 
ELAS (the National Liberation Front) despite the fact that they were ideologically 
opposing it, why did London insist on the rehabilitation of the monarch despite his low 
popularity and finally why the British allowed Germans to remain at Crete until mid-
1945. 
 
If the authentic texts of the protagonists of History are worth to be studied, it is for the 
various gradations of the facts presented in them which may either reveal hidden 
elements or act as shades that make the understanding of them much more difficult. 
Relative texts may offer more interpretations or enrichment of existing ones with the 
introduction of “working hypotheses” or investigatory questions. After all, history is 
not an one-dimensional and usually partial picture that someone is taught in school or  
in any other organization, but a multi-factorial and complex system of human actions. 
The contrasts do not always appear between the extreme points of view, but in many 
cases coexist among many versions of “good” and “evil”. The confidential report of 
Wallace seems to be a significant British text regarding the resistance activities in the 
mountainous Greece, in the middle of WWII (1943), and its upcoming future. 
 
 
 
WALLACE REPORT 
In July 1943 major David J. Wallace was chosen by the British Foreign Office
4 
to be 
sent to Greece in order to report on the current situation in the so called “Free Greece”, 
on the resistance groups operating there and on King George II popularity. At that time 
the British Military Mission in Greece was staffed by, approximately, 60 officers, 40 
non-commissioned officers, while it had more than 30 wireless receiving sets. Under 
the authority of brigadier Myers, commandant of the British Military Mission in Greece 
(SOE)
5 
came six different regional commandants with the rank of lieutenant colonel, 
while under them served several officers-liaisons, most of them with the rank of major, 
each one of them being responsible for the work of the liaison with the guerilla groups 
of his region. Under the authority of them came some officers of the special operations 
branch. To begin with, we have the view that specific aspects of that mission “betray” 
its real aims. Wallace, although major, was sent to occupied Greece to take over the 
  
position of the political advisor of brigadier Myers. Wallace notes: “I had been chosen 
for this position by Foreign Office and before I depart I was briefed in London, by 
Foreign Office and by SOE as well. Foreign Office and SOE had agreed on the limits of 
my jurisdiction. On the one hand SOE would employ me and during my stay in Greece 
I would be member of the staff of brigadier Myers. On the other hand however, my 
political guidance would be exercised by his Majesty’s ambassador at the Greek 
government, Reginald Leeper
6
. Our between telegraphs would be exchanged through 
the channels of SOE, but directly, with no delay and no intervention. Regarding the 
political issues, I would have the right to express my opinion to the ambassador without 
restrictions on condition that brigadier Myers would have previously seen my 
telegraphs. Any difference between brigadier Myers and myself, on political issues, 
would be solved in Cairo or in London”, (Wallace, 2009, p.45, 46). What do all these 
mean? The explanation is rather simple. British went through plans for the future of the 
region and asked for objective information, in short notice, from an “external observer” 
and not from its military mission! That is why the above (complicated for war period) 
arrangements of subordination and communication of the special delegate Wallace were 
settled. His classified report on the “British Policy and the Resistance Movements in 
Greece” was written in Cairo in 1943, (summarizing his information and analysis, from 
the short period of his stay in Greece, from 14/07/1943 until 09/08/1943). 
 
As he colorfully wrote in 1943, “the entire central alpine area of Greece that forms its 
backbone is entirely and perfectly unattached to any influence or contact with the 
occupation forces or the Quisling government in Athens … You can travel from Florina 
till the suburbs of Athens simply with the passport of EAM
7
. Before I went there 
myself, I hadn’t comprehend neither how extended, nor how free it is … In Free Greece 
there is neither central force, nor state. The administration is exercised at a village level. 
It is on the one hand, a mixture of the old institution of the mayor and of the civic 
council and on the other hand, of the new local EAM representative and the village 
committee. In reality, wider contact is maintained only with the guerilla groups and this 
of course means, in most cases, with EAM”, (Wallace, 2009, p. 49-51). 
 
However his report basically refers not to military issues, as it would be expected in the 
middle of 1943, but to the evaluation of the resistance groups, of their leaders and of 
the Joint General Resistance Headquarters, of king’s position and the views of key 
personalities on the issue of King himself, on monarchy and the political future of 
Greece. Consequently, Wallace mission was related to the military, political and 
economic future of Greece for which the British were preparing methodically their 
plans according to their strategic interests in the area. For drafting these plans (and 
initiatives) the British needed specialized and focused information of the type Myers 
could not provide. Among other aspects, the British were interested on the profiles of 
personalities that could (potentially) play a crucial (military or political) role in Greece 
after the end of war and Wallace was especially capable of providing such information. 
It is widely acknowledged that Wallace report influenced decisively policies and 
initiatives of British government regarding Greece during its civil war
8
. 
Wallace report is prophetic: he foresees the final conflict between British and EAM- 
ELAS. Furthermore, despite the fact that he pleads his “flexible political conscience”, 
he doesn’t hesitate to call “devious” the British policy of the constant reinforcement of 
the (under communist control) EAM-ELAS, with the perspective of its future 
  
eradication, with military means, when it will attempt to take over power. Wallace on 
one hand “refuses to believe” this “devious” policy but on the other hand he denounces 
it. 
 
 
INVESTIGATORY QUESTIONS 
 
At this point let us go through examining some questions, of stochastic nature and 
critical analysis. 
 
Question number one: Why the British reinforced EAM-ELAS, a pro-Soviet, powerful 
and strong movement, against their interests? 
An obvious answer would be that they reinforced it in order to battle their opponents in 
war, Germans, at least up to the second trimester of 1943, when their final victory was 
more obvious. In addition and after the successful landing operation of the Allies in 
Sicily, (July 1943), there was no reason, any longer, for the reinforcement of the Greek 
guerrilla groups in order for the Germans to be misled that the alleged landing  
operation would be in Greece. Since then we find it reasonable for them to start 
processing their future moves in the postwar diplomatic chessboard. 
 
However, understanding the weaknesses of EAM-ELAS
9
, they knew that they will be 
victorious in the future against it. The main concern of the British would be to exercise 
the maximum possible control over the partisans in order to achieve their strategic aim 
of putting Greece firmly under their influence. 
 
Question number two: Why London insisted on the rehabilitation of the monarch, when 
it had the briefing that he was unwelcome in Greece almost by everyone
10
? 
Wallace records many times that nobody wished the return of the King. He comments 
that King is justly accused of leaving, in wartime, out of the army the most capable 
officers (because of their democratic inclinations) and on the other hand all the 
dignitaries of Quisling’s government were monarchic officers. 
 
Despite that, Wallace worked on scenarios for the support of the exiled monarch, the 
most important of which was a suggestion for a blackmail of the democrats (who were 
at the same time anti-communists and anti- monarchic), that if they don’t support the 
return of the King the support of Britain will be revoked and the country will be left at 
the mercy of the Stalinists of EAM. The argument was persuasive since the latter had 
already begun persecutions by assassinating democratic officers and disarming right- 
wing resistance units. 
 
More specifically, when they are asked by the Department of Military Intelligence 
(DMI) in Cairo on the possibility of the return of King to Greece, on one hand Myers 
says that if the British impose the return of the King a revolution or a civil war will 
break out, while Wallace, on the contrary, responds that if the King declares that he will 
return with the Greek army, no revolution will take place, but this event will displease 
the people
11. The British taking into consideration Wallace’s report, “pushed” for the 
return of the monarch to Greece. 
  
It is certain that such an action would cause tensions and polarization in the Greek 
political system and it would not facilitate the accomplishment of a conciliatory 
solution. This leads us to the next question. 
 
Question number three: Is this what the British precisely wish? 
12
 
To answer to this question we will have to examine the long-term goals of the British 
diplomacy. We will next argue on a working hypothesis. Taking into account the pro- 
German history of the Greek monarchy, it is almost certain that for British a “straw 
man” type of King with weaknesses, no skills, disliked by the majority of the people 
and by a significant part of the political system and as a consequence depended on them 
will be the ideal choice. Such a King would easily support their policies or at least 
would not oppose them in the case that these policies were interfering with the interests 
of Greece. 
 
Question number four: Why did the Germans remain in Greece (Creta) till the middle 
of 1945? 
13
 
The Germans remained in the island of Crete for many months after their departure 
from mainland Greece following an understanding reached with the British aimed to 
keep EAM from taking over power. The government of Cairo encouraged the above 
plans, despite the fact that EAM had decided that its men would be incorporated into 
the National Civil Guard. The role of the British organizations ISDL and SOE was 
significant. The historical events will reach a peak during May- June 1945(!), when 
agents and recreants will try to take control of the liberation process of the city of 
Chania
14
. 
The departure of the Germans from Crete and also from Greece was massive and 
unobstructed by the British forces. As it was later revealed, an Anglo-German 
agreement had been reached regarding the surrender, by the Germans, of Athens and 
Thessaloniki without fighting. 
 
Albert Speer, minister of Hitler’s Military and Industrial Production, testifies15: “I am 
an auricular witness, in fall 1944, of a fact that has caused us a great impression. I 
specifically remember that general Jodl, commander in chief of the General (German) 
Staff, came one day and informed me that an agreement has been reached at a high 
level between England and Germany, that regarded Greece. This agreement, 
unprecedented till then and as far as I know unique in the whole Second World War, 
regarded - as Jodl told me - the evacuation of Greece from the German troops without 
any British annoyance (reaction). This agreement was made in Lisbon and I do not 
know whose initiative was, but I think that it was not done on a diplomatic level, but 
much higher, in order not to have breach of secrecy. 
 
The information for this strange “gentlemen agreement” between London and Berlin 
caused to those who were informed on it astonishment. And, indeed, the English abided 
by the agreement. The German warships and cargo ships were loaded with army from 
the Greek islands - that were evacuated - passed, in the fall 1944, unobstructed in front 
of the eyes of the British and among the British submarines in the Aegean and 
Mediterranean Sea. The price of the agreement, in our point of you, was for the 
Germans to hand over Thessaloniki to the British with no battle and by this way Greece 
to remain in the western camp”. 
  
 
 
WORKING HYPOTHESIS 
 
But are things as simple as they are usually presented? The strategic plan of the British 
for the postwar period, would certainly include our country, which would be “assigned” 
to the Western Camp
16
. At this point we decided to introduce a working hypothesis. 
Let’s assume that the war in Greece ended in 1945 (and not in 1944) and Greece had 
the opportunity to participate, united and at the side of winners, to the meetings 
regarding the postwar arrangements. Then an important issue would arise in the 
discussions and negotiations on which Greece and Britain would have opposite 
interests, namely the issue of Cyprus
17
. At this point we stress the fact that Wallace in 
his report downgraded the obvious and widely acknowledged contributions  of Greece 
in the war by carefully avoiding to refer to its victories against the Axis but focusing 
instead to certain negative aspects regarding the mobilization of armed forces of Greece 
against the Italians. He (most probably) “disclosed” in this way the British plans for 
Greece (to downgrade its contributions in order to weaken its position in the postwar 
negotiations as far as Cyprus is concerned). Already in 1941 London did not allow for 
the establishment of the Greek exiled government in Cyprus. The British knew that 
with regard to Cyprus (and their strategic interests and bases there) they wouldn’t have 
the sympathy and understanding of liberal (and anti-colonial) America and it would be 
then difficult to oppose convincingly a request for the union of Cyprus with Greece
18
. 
Furthermore, the British, as early as 1943, had understood that the Allies would win the 
war and that the Americans would be the dominant player in the postwar geo-political 
game. As with Wilson in 1918 the Americans would challenge their colonial policies 
and the inevitable creation of an Israeli state would terminate their colonial presence in 
Palestine. As a consequence, when Wallace was dispatched to occupied Greece, British 
diplomacy had already realized the negative for her aspects of the American 
participation in the war and most probably was in the mid of hectic efforts to assess 
alternative options for which it desperately needed specialized information. The 
possibility of the collapse of its control on the strategic axis Egypt-India greatly 
enhanced the strategic importance of Cyprus. Also, knowing very well that the Greek 
political system had extremely limited room to manoeuvre on Cyprus issue, the only 
remaining option for them was to weaken as much as possible the position of Greece 
when the time of the decisions would come. Wallace was most probably instructed to 
collect intelligence on the weak and strong aspects of personalities that were expected 
to play a crucial role in the postwar politics and the economic and military 
reorganization of the country. And Wallace responded with “painting” very successful 
and valuable portraits. It is characteristic that Wallace was particularly attracted by the 
efficiency and competence of the right-wing resistance leader colonel Psarros, who was 
expected to play a crucial role in the re-organization of the Greek army after the war. 
By an interesting coincidence, Psarros was assassinated shortly after the departure of 
Wallace from occupied Greece. 
 
Wallace also pointed out artfully another crucial aspect of the existing (locally) balance 
of power proceeding even with suggestions on how the situation could be exploited to 
the benefit of the British: “We will cause, in addition, an open war between the two 
  
camps (left and right), which will be more bloody than four months ago as a result of 
the significant increase of the power of the two sides …”, (Wallace, 2009, p. 139). 
 
Based on the existing facts, a proper and feasible short-term solution would be the 
enfeeblement and the isolation of Greece, through the provocation of an internal dispute 
(even a civil warfare), taking advantage among other things of the circumstances they 
had helped to be created/established in the “Free” Greece. On these circumstances and 
on the leaderships of several resistance groups (from right to left) the British were 
exercising an influence or control up to a specific point knowing their weaknesses and 
flaws
19
. Most probably, the collection of intelligence on the resistance groups and their 
leaders was the strategic goal of the strong British military presence in occupied 
Greece. So, the Greeks, the great winners of the war with Italian Fascists, dealing with 
their internal strife, will not be able to set up a claim against the British (Cyprus), 
against the new Geopolitical System in the Balkans (Northern Epirus) and against their 
former enemies and allies afterwards (compensations-indemnifications). Consequently 
the civil war favored significantly the British interests in the Middle East and the 
Balkans and at the same time and at a very critical moment for Greece it decisively 
weakened (at a multitude of levels and in great length of geo-political time) both 
Greece and Cyprus. 
 
We fairly consider that the crucial evolutions in Greece during 1943-49, were the result 
of a strategic plan on the part of British diplomacy, which was successfully 
implemented. The weaknesses (corruption, lack of national vision etc) of the leadership 
and of the important personalities of the country during that period contributed 
decisively to the successful implementation of this plan. The head of the American 
Economic Mission to Greece in 1947 Paul A. Porter reported extensively and 
characteristically on the complete inefficiency and corruption of the Greek political 
system, on the utter inefficiency of the King and on the controversial role of the 
British
20
. A company of collaborators, of naïve, ambitious, arriviste, power-lovers, 
opportunist, greedy and wicked politicians and people of economic power, by a 
surprising coincidence, managed to grasp the power in the most critical moment for 
Greece. They were the type of people who were not capable of foiling Churchill’s 
plans. The patriots, the technocrats, the prudent and the honest ones were isolated and 
marginalized. All the above to the amazement of Paul A. Porter and of many other 
analysts of that period who were raising a catalytic for the British question: What they 
were doing in Greece for two and a half years (until the Americans took over)? 
 
British government adopted almost fully the recommendations of Wallace Report
21
, 
except for the return of the King (an issue which was previously analyzed). Wallace’s 
comments on Archbishop Damaskinos heavily influenced the decision of the British to 
accept him as a temporary solution for the post of regency
22 
a decision that took into 
account his wide popular acceptance which was the result of his stance during the 
German occupation. Initially this option bumped into King George’s denial (he turned 
down a relevant suggestion by Emmanuel Tsouderos). Nevertheless the events of 
December 1944 (who might have caused them? it is almost certain that the British 
appropriately “handled” the situation so that gradually a controlled rupture would befall 
in Greece) forced King George to recede and Damaskinos took over as viceroy of 
Greece on 31 December 1944. 
  
The political scenery is in turmoil and Damaskinos is trying to balance on adversary 
powers that fight for their predominance and to undermine him. The British 
government, with Churchill as prime minister, is planning its next moves, having 
“arranged”(fixed), with the agreement of Yalta Conference (04-11/02/1945) the 
geopolitical position of Greece. The handling of the issue of Greece by Churchill, by 
writing hastily in a scrap of paper (that was given to Stalin) the partitioning of Greece 
into vague zones of influences, 90% for Britain and 10% for Soviet Union, was a highly 
controversial event (criticized even by the Americans) raising a plethora of questions: 
why 90% and not 85% or 95% and why British allowed for Soviet Union to have some 
kind of influence in the strategic peninsula of Greece and finally why all this 
controversial bargaining – looking like an old type grocery list - was taking place 
behind the back of the Americans?. Evidently, the percentages themselves had no other 
meaning except to register and secure a Soviet zone of influence in Greece so as this to 
give a pretext to the British to proceed with their plans of initiating a civil strife in 
Greece. Without an adversary with a strong and somehow “legalized” international 
support the communist uprising would have no chance to seriously challenge the 
national (right-wing) army of Greece. Many analysts from Greece are accusing Britain 
of its dubious and cynical policies in Greece that caused a civil war with hundreds of 
thousands of victims and tremendous social and economic hardships. Britain, after all, 
was defending its interests there with the way so many other powers in so many other 
circumstances did in the past, the Greek Empire of medieval times included. It was the 
responsibility of Greeks to fight the symptoms of a long and lethal decay (corruption, 
extreme political inefficiency and antagonisms, easy subjection of the political system 
to foreign orders from whatever direction etc) and to impose a “cleaning” on their 
backyard. 
 
On 15 May 1945 Damaskinos reaches Rhodes on board the warship “Averof” as the 
first Greek leader that visits the liberated Dodecanese. However, Damaskinos “crosses 
the red line” when he visits London (6 - 22 September 1945) accompanied by the 
director of his political office (diplomat and poet George Seferis) to have discussions 
with the new British government of Clement Attlee while at the same time his country 
is divided and at the mercy of traitors and collaborators of the Nazis who were left 
unpunished to form a protective barrier against the communist threat and of course 
against any attempt to challenge the designs of the foreign powers that offered them 
protection and immunity. There, with his pompous style Damaskinos files an official 
request for the unification of Cyprus with Greece
23 
, activating in this way the initiation 
of the British (civil strife) plans. This official request filed in London (reminding of the 
story of the hunter who puts his head in the lion’s mouth to file a request regarding his 
right to kill it) epitomized the remarkable ignorance of geo-politics by those handling 
national issues of the outmost importance, the lack of well-studied long term policy 
planning, the lack of national cohesion, the lack of professionalism etc to such a degree 
that is quite surprising for a country with the history of Greece. Of course, returning to 
Athens from his visit to London, a jubilant Viceroy with his custody of poets and 
foreign experts, announced to the Greek people (who suffered terribly for more than 
five years and desperately needed some news to invigorate their moral) that their 
leadership was brave enough and wise enough to challenge the mighty British lion at its 
home, demanding from it the satisfaction of a long standing and just request! Because 
in this country of proverbial inefficiency it is not the final results and consequences that 
matter but only the good intentions! And if at the end the outcome is negative then the 
easy excuse of “a Greece which is honest but very small to resist the wills of the mighty 
  
powers” is whispered around (recall the examples of King of Greece with respect to the 
issue of Crete in 1908 and of the Greek leadership in 1974 with respect to the issue of 
Cyprus in 1974). 
 
With his return to Greece
24
, the Viceroy watches the governments to collapse one after 
the other (the creation of political instability). On 31 March 1946 parliamentary 
elections are carried out without the participation of K.K.E (Communist Party of 
Greece), a fact that contributes decisively to the worsening of the political climate in 
the country. The plebiscite for the regime is carried out on 1 September 1946 and is in 
favor of the restoration of monarchy in Greece. Damaskinos resigns from the post of 
viceroy (for the third and final time on 28 September 1946) and retires to his 
ecclesiastic duties
25
. It is remarkable that a few months later, on 1 April 1947, the 
restored (but not trusted by the British) King George dies
26
. 
However, concerning the candidature for premiership of Plastiras
27 
(suggested also by 
Wallace!) who was called to take over the government as a personality of wide 
acceptance (on 3 January 1945- after the Riots of December 1944), London failed. 
During his short premiership (3/1-8/4/1945) he acted in a unifying way and tried to 
avert the Civil war (the first to call it as such). An important fact of that period is the 
Treaty of Varkiza. The British finally discerned, in Plastiras’ face, an impediment to the 
promotion of their political designs and interests in the area and as a consequence they 
“facilitated” the publication of Plastiras’ older texts, in which he exposed fascist 
opinions which resulted to his resignation. 
 
As a result of the strategic plans of London and the marginalization of those who tried 
to open the Cyprus issue, it didn’t take too long for the civil war to break out. This civil 
war was disastrous only for Greece since its position had been anchored in the “western 
geopolitical camp” with a firm and undisputable way28. 
At this point is worth to mention another parameter of the British policy in Greece, the 
pursue for an alternative option in case that the manipulated by them civil conflict in 
Greece would not work. This has to do with their designs to put Crete under their 
control (to exploit the Crete Factor). 
 
This working hypothesis can offer strong explanatory argumentation on the (hidden) 
aims behind the (controversial) British handling of the issue of evacuation of Crete 
from the German troops. For the shake of the argumentation of the above hypothesis 
the following facts are presented: 
 
a. Em. Mpandouvas,(one of the important contributors to the resistance in Crete), 
narrated to A. Sanoudakis that he was invited by Woodhouse of SOE, to lead 
(Mpandouvas) a autonomist movement with the support of England. As an 
exchange Mpandouvas would be nominated first president of the autonomous 
Crete. 
b. B. D. Vlandas writes in the book: “THE BETRAYED REVOLUTION 1941- 
44”, “…as the German occupation in Crete was coming to an end, at the 
prefecture of Rethymnon an English-initiated move for the autonomy of Crete 
was starting to take place…” 
  
c. The newspaper “DEMOCRACY of Chania” published in 1946 the following 
text that A. Nenedakis puts out in his book “THE PRIME RESERVIST”: “In 
April 1943 the English officer Fielding was propagandizing in Crete its 
annexation to England…or placing it under its protection…in a conversation he 
said that if after the war the English do not keep the whole island, they will 
definitely keep some parts of it that will be used as bases”. 
d. From the beginning of the occupation agents of SOE or FORCE 133 were 
acting at military but mainly at political level in the island. Indeed, in Cairo 
Hughes and Fielding found the group captain Andreas Volanis and after talking 
to him about the annexation of Crete to England and after had informed him of 
the benefits that Crete would have in such a case they suggested to him to come 
to the island along with Giparis and Kelaidis to work on that plan. 
 
 
THE GEOPOLITICAL DOCUMENTATION 
 
The policy of Britain was aiming of course to preserve/promote its interests in the area 
and it was compatible with the principles of the Anglo-Saxon Geopolitical School. 
Nevertheless, its founder H. Mackinder had included since 1919
29 
the so called 
“eastern dispute” in the wider strategic brainstorming for the competition between the 
Naval and Continental or Overland Powers of the planet. 
 
In his book
30
, he redefined in geo-political terms the “eastern dispute” as a continuous 
attempt of the Continental Power of Russia (Heartland) that seeks for ways of 
unimpeded access to the southern seas (Aegean and wider Eastern Mediterranean) and 
of the Western Naval Powers that want to monopolize the area. Which should be the 
geopolitical architecture that the West in the Eurasian area in order to avoid the threat 
emanating from Heartland designs? Geography reveals the necessity for the total 
control on the areas of three straits: 
 
A) The straits of Japan-Korea-Taiwan, in the East Pacific Ocean 
B) The straits of Skagerrak, in the North Atlantic Ocean 
C) The Aegean Sea and the straits of Dardanelles in the Mediterranean 
 
Soviet Union sought after a beneficial for it resolution of the “eastern dispute” focusing 
instead of the free access to the Indian Ocean (which, with the “help” of the effective 
British diplomatic manoeuvre there, was proved economically and geo-politically 
extremely costly) to the unimpeded access to the sea of Northern Europe and mainly to 
the warm sea of the Mediterranean. H. Mackinder, fully understanding the geopolitical 
visions of the Soviet Union and exploiting the military history of World War II as a 
base for the implementation of his geopolitical ideas summarized his theories in an 
article titled “The Round World and the Victory of Peace” published in the American 
semiofficial magazine “Foreign Affairs” in July 1943 (when the Nazism defeat at the 
Russian front was more clear). At the same time he suggested a geopolitical security 
structure of the postwar world suggesting the foundation of a Western Alliance that will 
be finally realized in the form of NATO in 1949. 
 
In the above article Mackinder argued that “After considering all the factors, the 
conclusion is inevitable: If Soviet Union in this war conquers Germany, it should be 
ranked as the biggest Overland Power in the planet. And something more; it will be the 
  
biggest force in the most strategically powerful defensive position. Heartland is the 
biggest natural fort on earth. For the first time in History this fort will be manned by a 
guard satisfactory in quantity and quality”. 
 
The geopolitical treatise “The Geography of Peace” of the American analyst and 
professor of political sciences Nicolas Spykman, published in 1944, simply confirmed 
Mackinder’s side concerning the evaluation of the situation from a geopolitical point of 
view! If we examine the world geopolitical map of the time, the Overland Power, 
USSR, (that coincides entirely with the Eurasian Heartland), is surrounded by a 
geographical ring (Rimland), that begins from the European space in the West up to the 
Japanese Isles to the East. Europe and Japan are the main keys of a radical solution to 
the “eastern dispute”, since these areas have double geopolitical value: on the one hand, 
they are the ends of the wider space of the Naval Power, whose center is taken up by 
the USA and the other hand, they are the extreme points of Rimland, which delimit the 
south front of the then USSR and include many countries as the states of the Middle 
East, India and China. 
 
If we take a view of this global geopolitical architecture of the West from the side of 
USA (the protagonist, in the postwar era, of the new geopolitical reality) we easily 
understand that the Sea of Japan and the Mediterranean Sea are the two major gravity 
areas (poles) of that system of dominance. In the geopolitical map, the American 
continent is well orientated towards the North-South axis and the central core of the 
“eastern dispute”, that is the Eastern Mediterranean, is clearly emerging as the 
“Eastern Pole” of the western geopolitical architecture, while the Sea of Japan 
emerges as the “Western pole” of it. In this context the geo-strategic value of 
Cyprus is of paramount importance for the West and particularly for Britain 
which has two military bases in the island of Aphrodite recently ‘upgraded’ to 
small state entities for “better geo-political protection”. 
 
The enormous geopolitical significance of the above two poles is shown by the two 
fierce civil wars erupted at these poles (Greek and Korean peninsulas) soon after the 
end of World War II. Both civil wars were conflicts between the Western Naval Powers 
and Heartland, as their competition was escalating in the frame of the newly re-defined 
“eastern dispute”. 
 
A. Pearce, referring to the support that was granted to the Greek governmental army by 
the Anglo-Saxons (in the introduction of the 1966 edition of Mackinder’s book 
“Democratic ideals and Reality”) he notes the following: “In 1919 Mackinder thought 
that the occupation of Greece by a big power of Heartland would postulate the probable 
control of the World Island. According to the Yugoslav leader Milovan Djilas: 
(Conversations with Stalin, New York, 1962, p.181-182), Stalin moved to stop the 
Greek civil war because he understood that America and England would never tolerate 
a communist Greece in their Mediterranean “salvation board”. The case of the Korean 
civil war (1950-1953) was similar, when the powers of the Allies fought to stop the 
communist expansion from the northern territories of the Eurasian Heartland. 
 
Consequently the British leadership with Churchill as prime minister would do 
anything in order Greece not to be “removed” from the Western camp, confirming the 
geopolitical fear of the Allies regarding the expansion of the USSR in the 
Mediterranean. However, in the Treaty of Yalta all the above were basically adopted by 
  
the West. But just this wasn’t enough! Greece shouldn’t be, in the postwar era, capable 
of asserting its rights upon the trophies of the winners of the war. So the terms of this 
agreement were neither announced, nor published. The British prime minister planned 
and executed a controversial policy (which could be characterized also as vagabond if 
we assume – rather wrongly - that diplomatic practice and justice go together) for a 
nation that fought courageously and had many losses during its occupation by the 
Nazis. Nevertheless this policy was not outlandish for him. Indicatively, we note that as 
a Minister of the Navy during the First World War and loyal to the illations of geo- 
politics and the old diplomatic practices of his country, Churchill had chosen to 
enfeeble Russia, his ally in the Entente Cordiale, (by applying a superb - but cynical - 
diplomatic stratagem, analyzed in the previous paper of this issue), instead of allowing 
Tsar to fulfill the grand idea of Romanof to conquer Constantinople and the 
Dardanelles re-establishing in this way the Eastern Roman Empire under their rule. At 
this point we would like to stress the fact that ‘diplomatia’ (the Greek origin of the 
word ‘diplomacy’) means to employ or project two different (and as a rule 
contradicting to each other) eye-views for the same issue in order to deceive your 
enemy or competitor. Hence, by its historical definition and application diplomacy is 
cynical and as such it abides by the principles of justice only if the costs of their 
violation exceed the benefits drawn from its respect. For example, Eastern Romans 
(medieval Greeks, Byzantines) were masters of diplomacy and as a result were 
frequently accused by the Francs and the English (who at that time had not yet mastered 
the art of diplomacy) as cynical and vagabond in the same way that many analysts now 
days characterize British diplomacy. On the other hand the efforts to unmask the 
cynical character of diplomacy and the sources of it to the wide public will force 
diplomacy in the long run to respect justice more than it does today. 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
[1a] http://www.defencenter-energeo.org/ 
This paper presents findings of an ongoing research project titled “British foreign 
policy in Greece” undertaken by CEDEG’s Study Group with the participation of the 
following researchers: Thomas Vlachostergios and Nektarios Ginakis. 
[1b] John Karkazis is Professor of Operations Research in the Department of Shipping, 
Trade and Transport (STT), University of the Aegean at Chios, Greece and President, 
Constantine Porphyrogenetus Int. Ass., Chios, Greece. 
[1c] Ioannis Vidakis, is Commodore (ret) HN (supply corps), CEDEG Director and 
Coordinator of CEDEG’s Study Group and a Ph.D. candidate, University of the Aegean 
at Chios, Greece. 
The writers gladly invite ideas and comments in the e-mail address: 
geopolitics.studies@gmail.com 
[2] “British foreign policy and resistance movements in Greece. The confidential report 
of major David J. Wallace (1943)” (in Greek), transl. Petros Makris-Staikos 
(Mετάφραση: Πέτρος Mακρής-Στάικος, εκδόσεις Ωκεανίδα, 2009). 
[3] Relevant articles in the Greek press: “BHMA(VIMA)” 18.10.09, “NEA” 28.11.09 
and 05.12.09, “Eleftherotipia” 05.12.2009, “BHMA(VIMA)” 20.12.2009, 10.01.10, 
24.01.10&31.01.10. “Rizospastis” 14.02.10 
[4] Wallace was an expert on the Ancient Greek and Latin literature and a graduate of 
the Heathfield, Eton and Balliol College of Oxford. 
  
[5] The Special Operations Executive (SOE) was a World War II British covert 
military actions organization. It was established by Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
and Minister of Economic Warfare Hugh Dalton on 22 July 1940, to conduct warfare 
against the Axis powers by means other than direct military engagement. Its mission 
was to encourage and facilitate espionage and sabotage behind enemy lines and in its 
early days, to serve as the core of the Auxiliary Units. It was also known as "Churchill's 
Secret Army" or "The Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare". The organization directly 
employed or controlled just over 13,000 people. 
[6] Reginald Wildig Allen Leeper (25 March 1888 – 2 February 1968) was a British 
civil servant and diplomat. Rex Leeper (as he was known) began his government career 
at the Intelligence Bureau of the Department of Information during the First World 
War. He became head of Britain's Political Intelligence Department when it was 
reformed in 1938. He was British ambassador to the Greek government from 1943 to 
1946 (in exile in Cairo until October 1944). 
[7] ”National Liberation Front”, its main driving force was according to Churchill at 
90% communist. 
[8] The bureau that chose Wallace for this mission and the time of his mission signal at 
first two things: the British were developing strategic plans for the postwar era and 
were particularly interested on the Greek factor. 
[9] Wallace, (2009, p. 127): “The last terrifying element of the situation is that EAM 
has never been weaker than today. And there has never been a more favorable moment 
for demonstration of force against it. EAM will not dare the rupture with Great Britain, 
because it will be driven to devastation”. 
[10] “I have no doubt for the big anti-popularity of the king in the Free Greece. He is 
the victim of a two and a half years intensively pressing and everlasting propaganda, 
the biggest part of which although unfair, it is believable. Since Metaxas has passed 
away and consequently according to the point of view of the Greek politician the 
constant polemic against him is redundant, all the hatred to his dictatorship has now 
been transferred to the face of the king. Metaxas’ dictatorship has definitely been 
invidious. It had the bad luck to end with a military disaster. So, the king is held 
responsible for both of them”, (Wallace, 2009, p. 99). 
[11] Wallace, (2009, p. 23). In addition, “…Mr. Kartalis (leader of EKKA) summarized 
to me the political views of EKKA as follows: “ a. EKKA is asking for radical social 
reformation , b. It is opposed to the king, because it considers his presence 
uncompromising with the previous, while in Greece the tradition of apolitical 
constitutional monarchy according to the English standard, hasn’t been experienced, c. 
It considers the communists and the Slavs as the two biggest hazards for Greece, d. 
EAM, with the pan-Balkan policy, makes easier the communist and Slav penetration to 
Greece and e. For that, in the worst case scenario EKKA will accept the king, if that 
will be the minimum condition for the British to protect Greece against the above prime 
dangers”, Wallace, (2009, p. 82). 
12)”The People at the Top Can Do These Things, Which Others Can’t Do”: 
Winston Churchill and the Greeks, 1940-45, Thanasis D. Sfikas, Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 26, No 2 (Apr., 1991), pp. 307-332. Published by: Sage 
Publications, Ltd. 
[13] The Germans were disarmed on 23 May 1945, when the regiment of the Hamshire 
reached the island. The German soldiers departed from Crete by ships on 12 June with 
all of their personal stuff, a month after the surrender of the 3d Reich! 
[14] For more details see Douka Maro, (2010). “Justice is too tough”, Published by 
Patakis. 
  
[15] In an interview to B. Mathiopoulos that had been published in 1976, in the 
newspaper “BHMA”, (the fragment is from his book: “The December of 1944”. 
[16] For Greece, H. Mackinder had already written, that…”her conquest by a strong 
overland Power it will probably give to that power the ability to control the World 
Island” , from the speech of the General and Academic D. Skarvelis during the opening 
of the 3rd International Convention of EL.ES.ME, on 10 November 2003. The 
presidential delegate in Greece in 1947 American officer P. Porter writes: “Greece has 
for us a wider meaning than what her size and her geographical location would connote. 
She has a strategic position and has been the stronghold of the democratic world in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, thanks to her naval spirit, her historic traditions and the 
character of her people”. 
[17] Other issues might have been the future of Northern Epirus and the war 
indemnifications. 
[18] Prime Minister Emanuel Tsouderos had included Cyprus to a memorandum that he 
handed over to the President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in June 1942. Later, the vice- 
President of the (exiled) government Panagiotis Kanellopoulos proceeded with handing 
over a similar memorandum to Anthony Eden (December 1942). 
[19] Wallace in several points of his report evaluates several key personalities by 
drawing their profiles with emphasis on their weak and strong points. 
[20] “A miracle is sought for Greece. The diary of an American Delegate. Paul A. 
Porter”, (in Greek), ΒΗMΑ Mαρτυρίες, 2010 
[21] However as it is mentioned in the “Introduction of the book”- (2009, p. 23), 
Wallace Report is forwarded to Anthony Eden and its influence on the British policy 
regarding EAM-ELAS and SOE in Cairo, will be catalytic. 
[22] “And it is a misfortune that in reality there was no eminent royalist that has been 
assigned head of the popular resistance against the Axis. Even former Archbishop 
Chrysanthus, a remarkable man, as I am sure, was inferior in strength compared to the 
current Archbishop of Athens Damaskinos, who was denied, quite unjustly as many 
support, the archbishop’s throne by Metaxas and the King. By the way, Damaskinos, as 
I comprehend, is a hero for the people of Athens and a personality of great political 
influence”. (Wallace, 2009, p. 102). 
[23] Actually he commits a strategic error demarcating the end of his stay in the 
regency. 
[24] After he had symbolically laid a remembrance wreath at the Arc de Triumph in 
Paris. 
[25] He passed away in Athens in 20 May 1949 at the age of 59. 
[26] And the palace, reacting to Damaskinos’ presence at the funeral, they call former 
Archbishop Chrysanthus to perform the ceremony. 
[27] “The brigadier Myers opposed the idea of bringing back Plastiras to Greece, being 
afraid of the fact that his arrival will not be agreeable to EAM. If needed, he will only 
be able to return as head of EDES, according to the constitutional chart of it. Plastiras is 
the most important personality in the Greek resistance movement and as I think (upon 
his return to Greece), we could, possibly, be faced with a real collapse of EAM. By this 
way we will achieve our goal, without breaking any of our obligations, simply by 
introducing a new factor that is not covered by any other previous agreement. By the 
way, Plastiras’ biggest influence is exercised in those regions that EAM monopolizes 
power, namely Thessalia and Macedonia. Regarding foreign policy Plastiras  had 
always been faithful to England and his presence will be a serious guarantee that 
Greece will continue to fight efficiently on our side…”. (Wallace, 2009, p. 144-5). 
[28] Yalta conference, (04-11/02/1945) 
  
[29] H. Mackinder supported these opinions mainly in his essay “Democratic Ideals and 
Reality” that was published in 1919, when the Treaties of peace of the World War I 
were signed. Before publishing these theories Mackinder analyzed them as head master 
of the London School of Economics during the period 1903-1908, before becoming 
member of the British Parliament in 1910, having full consciousness of the geopolitical 
situation. 
[30] H. Mackinder,“Democratic Ideals and Reality. A Classic Work on Geography and 
World Power”, Norton, 1962, New York, p. 108. 
[31] Relative article “…”, in the magazine “Greek Defense & Techonology”, issue n. 
X, May 2011. 
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